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Draft EU Quantum Act of November 2026: Post-Quantum Migration, Critical Quantum Components and Procurement Along Kop's Two-Pillar Blueprint

On 11 April 2024 the European Commission asked the member states to prepare a coordinated transition to post-quantum cryptography. The instrument it chose was a Recommendation, which under Article 288 TFEU has no binding force. The draft EU Quantum Act reported by The Quantum Insider on 10 November 2026 is drafted as a regulation, and it would turn that coordination into binding Union law. The leaked draft EU Quantum Act moves along the architecture I set out in Towards a European Quantum Act: A Two-Pillar Framework for Regulation and Innovation (Columbia Journal of European Law 31-1, 2025), the first comprehensive legal blueprint for such an Act, with its recommendations published on the European Commission's Futurium platform. Three of its core proposals now appear in the draft: a binding, Union-wide migration to post-quantum cryptography with Commission-set milestones; a Chips Act-style industrial pillar, which the draft now fills with concrete 2030 targets; and Commission monitoring of quantum supply-chain dependencies, including a list of critical components and scrutiny of foreign acquisitions.

Open dilution-refrigerator chandelier of a superconducting quantum computer, with gold-plated stages, copper heat links and blue coaxial cables, while a gloved hand tightens a connector with a torque wrench in a bright European laboratory


The two-pillar design in the Columbia article and the Futurium brief of 17 September 2025

My 2025 Columbia article set out a two-pillar architecture for a European Quantum Act, combining regulation with industrial and security policy. The first pillar follows the New Legislative Framework of 2008: risk-based essential requirements, harmonized standards, conformity assessment and, through certifiable quality management systems, a route to a CE mark. The second pillar follows the European Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781: investment in pilot lines and production capacity, security of supply, and instruments to watch over dependencies.

The policy brief I coauthored with Tracey Forrest, A Strategic Framework for the European Quantum Act: A Standards-First Approach, translated that framework into recommendations for European policymakers. It placed standards first and asked European standards bodies to align with their U.S. counterparts, particularly NIST, because the aim is "a unified, trusted transatlantic market." I developed its procurement and allied-cooperation mechanisms further in A Bletchley Park for the Quantum Age (War on the Rocks, November 6, 2025), the subsequent Nexus paper, and Before Q-Day with Joe Federici (War on the Rocks, July 20, 2026), proposing validated cryptography as a purchasing condition, certification-based access to allied markets, reciprocity-based exceptions for trusted partners, and periodic reassessment of restrictions. The reported draft brings several of these proposals into the same legislative framework.


Post-quantum migration: from the 2024 Recommendation to reporting duties and Commission milestones

The Columbia article contains a model provision on quantum cybersecurity and Q-Day preparedness. It would mandate "a strategic plan for migrating the EU's critical digital and cryptographic infrastructure to quantum-safe standards," with clear timelines and technical standards aligned with international bodies such as NIST, and it described the result as a "legally-binding migration to post-quantum-cryptography (PQC) strategy." The same provision introduced a new legal duty of Anticipatory Data Stewardship: an obligation for organizations to protect data against foreseeable future technological threats, in particular the risk that adversaries harvest encrypted data now and decrypt it later.

The draft, as reported, addresses the same threat through obligations with different addressees. Member states would report on their preparedness within six months of entry into force and annually thereafter, and the Commission could set binding migration milestones and timelines where it concludes that they are necessary for a coordinated transition. Public buyers in critical sectors would face a purchasing obligation, discussed below. These provisions bind states, the Commission and contracting authorities; the duty of Anticipatory Data Stewardship that the article proposed would reach organizations generally, and the report does not describe such a general duty. For lawyers the change of instrument is the significant step. The 2024 Recommendation and the coordinated roadmap that followed relied on voluntary alignment by national authorities. A regulation applies directly in every member state, and a Commission power to set milestones would give public bodies and suppliers in critical sectors a Union-level timetable that national budgets and tender calendars have to meet.


The list of critical quantum components and the Quantum Criticality Index

The draft, as reported, would have the Commission monitor supply dependencies and maintain a list of critical quantum components, and its assessments could consider risks from foreign acquisitions or from the relocation of important activities outside the Union. Its industrial provisions give priority to quantum foundries, chip fabrication and packaging, control electronics, cryogenics, lasers, detectors and precision equipment, and they set targets of about 100 error-corrected logical qubits per system by 2030 or soon after, interoperable metropolitan quantum networks by 2030 and an interconnected EuroQCI by 2031.

The Columbia article proposed a data-driven method for the same task. A Quantum Criticality Index would identify and prioritize chokepoints, such as niobium, indium or ytterbium, often processed in China, so that the Union could choose between stockpiling, diversification and domestic development. The article joined this to investment screening and to review of outbound investment in sensitive dual-use technologies. The report does not say which method the Commission would use to compile its list. In my view, a list of critical components is the legal form through which an index of this kind could operate, and the same list could then guide monitoring, the assessment of foreign acquisitions and the selection of strategic projects.

Europe's experience with AI exposes a scale problem. The Union has no homegrown cloud platform with the global reach and financial capacity of the leading U.S. hyperscalers. In quantum, Europe has an emerging ecosystem of startups and scale-ups, supported by strong research institutions and specialist suppliers of the cryostats, lasers and control electronics on the draft's priority list. Turning that base into a durable industry requires growth capital, production capacity and customers willing to buy and deploy its technologies. Public procurement can help firms establish a commercial track record, while access to allied markets can support expansion. Eligibility rules should therefore be assessed for their effects on security, competition and the ability of European firms to scale.


Post-quantum readiness as a purchasing condition for critical sectors

As reported, procurement procedures that start six months after entry into force would require infrastructure, equipment and systems in designated critical sectors to be post-quantum ready and to support crypto-agility. Where no suitable solution exists, a product would need crypto-agility and a documented migration plan, and limited exceptions would require a technical and security assessment, compensating protections and deadlines for upgrade or replacement. Cost or supplier preference alone would not justify an exception. Buyers would also assess security of supply, interoperability and support over a product's operating life.

The draft's post-quantum procurement clause adopts the mechanism I proposed earlier for U.S. federal purchasing and for a trans-Atlantic certification profile. In A Bletchley Park for the Quantum Age I proposed "conditioning all federal purchases on validated cryptography," machine-readable cryptography bills of materials, annual crypto-agility drills, and mutual recognition between NIST's validation program and the EU's Common Criteria scheme, with "reciprocity with trusted suppliers." Before Q-Day added cryptographic bills of materials and vendor migration road maps as procurement documents. Security of supply, from the Columbia article, and certified interoperability, from the Bletchley Park piece, now appear among the draft's buyer criteria. The six-month period, the exception regime and the reporting cycle are the draft's own drafting. AIRecht described the U.S. counterpart of this route in its post on the FAR rule that will put post-quantum cryptography into federal contracts, and quentir.ai sets out the clause-level detail and the questions under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement in its earlier post on the draft.


The EU-controlled supplier rule under the LSI test

The one element I have not proposed is the ownership test. The draft would generally limit strategic projects and public procurement of quantum products, systems and services to EU-controlled companies. Where a strategic partnership allows reciprocal participation, the Commission could authorize access for firms from partner countries, subject to safeguards on security, intellectual property and European technological interests. That reciprocity route matches the allied-access arrangements I proposed, and my procurement preferences are certification-based. The Nexus paper of 2026 prefers capability-aware controls to "a blunt nationality proxy" and holds that standards "cannot be turned into covert trade barriers." AIRecht reported its indexing in the NASA Astrophysics Data System in August.

Building on the allied-access arrangements I developed and on the LSI test, which I introduced in that paper and have developed since, I consider that the EU-controlled eligibility rule warrants separate scrutiny. In legal terms, the LSI test is a proportionality test with a built-in subsidiarity check that places legal friction at the layer of the quantum stack where it can affect the targeted capability. Restrictions should address demonstrable security risks through the least trade-restrictive, security-sufficient and innovation-preserving means available. Access for allied partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and South Korea should follow published, certification-based criteria with periodic review. Ownership alone should not exclude a supplier where a narrower security measure would suffice. Published criteria keep the market open to new entrants.


What the report leaves open, and who has cited the Columbia blueprint since 2025

The report does not describe conformity-assessment or harmonized-standards provisions, so the regulatory pillar of the blueprint is not yet visible in the draft, and the Commission has not published an official proposal. The text may change before it does. Within about a year the Columbia article was cited across eight countries. The literature on a European Quantum Act that followed cites, discusses and builds on the blueprint, the first of its kind: Andrea Crismani's study of quantum technology law in CERIDAP (2/2026), Rostam J. Neuwirth's "A Future European Union 'Quantum Act'?" in the Macau Journal of Global Legal Studies (2025), and the position paper by Adrian Schmidt, Zeki C. Seskir and Pieter Vermaas of KIT and TU Delft (arXiv 2607.22049).

A hospital, a grid operator or a ministry that may later tender systems under such rules has contracts running today, and those contracts decide whether a supplier owes a migration plan or a cryptographic inventory at all. The AIRecht AI- & ICT-contractscan reads such AI and ICT agreements and flags clauses on security, updates and supplier obligations that deserve a closer look before a post-quantum requirement arrives.

Sources: Mauritz Kop, "Towards a European Quantum Act: A Two-Pillar Framework for Regulation and Innovation", Columbia Journal of European Law 31(1) (2025), also arXiv 2509.14262; Mauritz Kop and Tracey Forrest, Futurium policy brief, 17 September 2025; Matt Swayne, "Draft EU Quantum Act Would Favor European Suppliers, Set Computing and Security Targets", The Quantum Insider, 10 November 2026 (report on an unofficial draft); European Commission, Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, 11 April 2024; Mauritz Kop, "A Bletchley Park for the Quantum Age", War on the Rocks, 6 November 2025; Mauritz Kop, "The Nexus of Quantum Technology, Intellectual Property, and National Security", arXiv 2602.15051 (2026), pp. 62-64; Mauritz Kop and Joe Federici, "Before Q-Day: The Race to Quantum First", War on the Rocks, 20 July 2026; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 (European Chips Act). Links checked 18 November 2026.