The Center for a New American Security has published The Entanglement Edge: U.S. Strategic Priorities in Quantum Networking—and Mauritz Kop briefed the CNAS research team on quantum networking and cybersecurity in November 2025, as part of the expert interviews behind it.
The entanglement edge, soberly measured
The report by Constanza M. Vidal Bustamante and Morgan Peirce declines the hype on both sides. Quantum key distribution is a niche complement, not a replacement, for post-quantum cryptography; China's 10,000-kilometer QKD network is real infrastructure but not next-generation readiness; and America's task is to fund what compounds—interconnects, benchmarks, supply chains, PQC migration—while declining to subsidize theater.
Where Kop's briefing landed
Kop gave the researchers an administrable rule: "PQC by default"—QKD only where incremental assurance can be proven over cost and complexity, quantum random-number generators widely for stronger entropy. His briefing pressed the shift from guidance to verifiable outcomes: a federal transition lead with a public dashboard, procurement requiring validated FIPS 203/204/205 modules, crypto-agility drills, and allied "one test, many markets" certification so the coalition's cryptographic baseline cannot fracture into a quantum splinternet. It is the operational sequel to the positions he brought to the U.S. Department of State on quantum technology and foreign policy.
What planners should take away
The harvest-now, decrypt-later campaigns are already running; the contest that decides their outcome is over verification—whose security architecture can be tested, certified, and trusted across an alliance. Reports built on dozens of expert interviews, rather than vendor decks, are how that architecture gets designed before the deadline arrives.
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